We measure the extent to which the cyclical behavior of the turnover of equity shares generated by individual investors on the NYSE can be accounted for by a single source of trade embedded in a neoclassical growth economy with dynamically complete markets. The source of trade is heterogeneity in agents'…nancial wealth. In the postwar U.S., turnover has been more than seven times as volatile as output, and has exhibited asynchronous cyclical characteristics: lagged turnover has co-varied positively with output, and led turnover negatively. The baseline model, calibrated to match the mean behavior of asset returns and the distribution of wealth across households, accounts for 29% of the level of turnover observed in the data, and 22% of the volatility.
Introduction
Here we seek to add to our understanding of quantities by conducting a measurement exercise. The goal is to determine the extent to which the cyclical behavior of the turnover of equity shares generated by individual investors on the New York Stock Exchange can be accounted for by a single source of trade embedded in a simple asset-pricing model.
The model is a one-sector neoclassical growth economy with dynamically complete markets.
The source of trade is heterogeneity among agents along a single dimension: their levels of …nancial wealth. The upshot of this heterogeneity is that productivity shocks spur disparate responses in asset demand across agent types by generating changes in the stock of capital, which gives rise to trade in …nancial markets. The lead question we address is the following: to what extent can the level and cyclical behavior of equity-share turnover be attributed to the simple mechanism that generates trade in our model?
Our analysis relates to four literatures. The …rst examines empirical characteristics of trade. Beginning with studies focussed on aggregate data, Gallant, Rossi and Tauchen (1992) characterized distributional properties of aggregate trading volume using daily data; Hiemstra and Jones (1994) following periods of relatively low returns. For evidence on these tendencies and an extensive literature review, see Kaniel, Saar and Titman (2008) . As far as we are aware, the businesscycle properties of turnover remain unexplored.
The second literature focusses on asset trade from a theoretical perspective. This work follows Judd, Kubler and Schmedders (2003) , who established the inability of Lucas '(1978) asset-pricing model to generate non-trivial asset trading under dynamically complete markets. In particular, they showed that, after some initial rebalancing in short-and long-lived assets, agents choose a …xed equilibrium portfolio that is independent of the aggregate state of economy. In so doing, equilibrium stock trading (and thus turnover) goes to zero from period 1 onwards. This …nding established as an open question the nature of extensions to Lucas'environment necessary or su¢ cient for generating changes in equilibrium portfolios.
In addressing this issue, Bossaerts and Zame (2006) , Espino and Hintermaier (2007) , and Espino (2007) established that when the model economy features changing degrees of heterogeneity across agents, …xed-portfolio trading strategies will not be optimal in equilibrium. By studying a stationary pure exchange economy with complete markets, Judd, Kubler and Schmedders (2003) abstracted from changing heterogeneity, and showed that equilibrium trading disappears. Bossaerts and Zame (2006) overturned this result by assuming that a crucial dimension of heterogeneity changes through time. In contrast, Espino and Hintermaier (2007) and Espino (2007) extended Lucas ' (1978) model by introducing neoclassical production speci…cations, and established theoretically conditions under which changes in heterogeneity can arise endogenously as a function of the evolution of the capital stock. Consequently, equilibrium asset trading arises in these setting despite the absence of frictions or market imperfections.
The third literature focusses on the behavior of asset prices in production economies with complete markets amenable to analysis from the perspective of a representative agent (for a detailed overview, see Lettau, 2003) . Early work in this area (Danthine et al., 1992; Rouwenhorst, 1995) showed that relative to endowment economies featuring agents with constant relative risk aversion (CRRA) preferences over consumption, the equity premium underscored by Mehra and Prescott (1985) , coupled with the risk-free rate puzzle underscored by Weil (1989) , becomes all the more puzzling given the incorporation of a production sector. This result arises from the ability of agents to make adjustments in the production sector, which enhances the pursuit of consumption-smoothing objectives. However, Jermann (1998) showed that the addition of capital-adjustment costs, coupled with the speci…cation of habit formation in consumption, is su¢ cient to account for return behavior given the incorporation of a production sector. Boldrin, Christiano and Fisher (2001) obtained similar results by coupling habit formation with a multi-sector production speci…cation with limited intersectoral factor mobility. For overviews of the equity premium and risk-free rate puzzles, see Kocherlakota (1996) and Mehra and Prescott (2003) .
The fourth literature has sought to determine whether departures from the representativeagent framework, coupled with a particular breakdown in market completeness, hold the potential for helping account for asset-pricing puzzles. Early investigations into this possibility (e.g., Telmer, 1993 ; Den Haan, 1996; Heaton and Lucas, 1996; Krusell and Smith, 1997) led
Krusell and Smith to conclude that "... success in explaining asset prices with this endeavor has been partial at best." [p.388] More recently, Guvenen (2009) has developed a simple two-agent model featuring limited stock-market participation that is relatively successful in accounting for the behavior of asset prices, but that implies counterfactual business-cycle behavior for consumption and investment. The relationship of our paper to this literature is indirect. In order for agent heterogeneity to carry implications for asset prices, it is necessary to incorporate some sort of departure from the complete markets assumption. Note that in adhering to market completeness in our framework, we have not attempted to make headway in the characterization of asset prices using heterogeneity as a mechanism. Instead, our aim is to introuduce heterogeneity in order to make headway in explaining asset turnover.
Our structural characterization of equity turnover takes as a point of departure the su¢ ciency conditions for asset trade established by Espino (2007) . In particular, working in a frictionless framework, Espino showed that when initial di¤erences in wealth serve as the sole source of heterogeneity across agents, two conditions are su¢ cient for generating trade: risk aversion that varies with ‡uctuations in wealth; and a lack of perfect collinearity across human and …nancial wealth (de…ned as the discounted present value of wage and non-wage income). The structure we study satis…es both conditions, while remaining parsimonious and transparent in terms of the mechanism that serves to generate trade. Speci…cally, the model features a single good produced via a neoclassical production speci…cation. The good may either be consumed or invested. There are two assets: a bond that delivers one sure unit of consumption in the next period; and equity shares issued by a representative …rm. Thus, the model characterizes trade as the exchange of equity and bond holdings. Production is subject to a two-state shock to total factor productivity. This shock is the only source of uncertainty in the economy, thus markets are dynamically complete.
The economy is populated by agents who di¤er only in terms of their …nancial wealth.
Following the seminal work of Stone (1950) and Geary (1954) , the agents have CRRAtype preferences, modi…ed to feature a minimum consumption requirement. Regarding the su¢ ciency conditions established by Espino (2007) , non-zero capital depreciation is su¢ cient to eliminate collinearity between human and …nancial wealth; and the minimum consumption requirement is su¢ cient to link variations in wealth with variations in risk aversion. 1 The model has two additional features introduced to account for the equity premium and risk-free rate puzzles: capital adjustment costs and state-dependent preferences. The former is modelled following Jermann (1988) . The latter is introduced to generate a relatively volatile pricing kernel using a relatively modest speci…cation of risk aversion. In our setting, both features are needed to account jointly for the puzzles. We de…ne as a baseline the special case under which these additional features are shut down. This is attractive because it provides the clearest understanding of the mechanism that serves to generate trade. We then generalize the model, imposing as discipline in the parameterization stage (in part) its characterization of mean return behavior. Subject to this constraint, we evaluate its characterization of turnover. 2 Two factors are critical for determining the behavior of turnover in this setting. First, because agents di¤er in their holdings of …nancial wealth, productivity shocks generate differential impacts on the evolution of individual wealth, and thus on changes in asset demand. 1 Preference speci…cations that link variations in …nancial wealth with variations in risk aversion have proven useful for characterizing asset returns; e.g., see Campbell and Cochrane (1999) , and Gordon and St.
Amour (2004).
2 While we follow Espino (2007) in emphasizing wealth di¤erences as a critical source of trade, the model we examine here di¤ers from his along two dimensions. First, we have followed the asset-pricing literature in incorporating features designed to characterize return behavior (e.g., capital adjustment costs, etc.). Second, we have extended his simple asset-market structure (which included only Arrow-Debreu securities) in order to focus on patterns of equity trade in aggregate …nancial markets. Thus while Espino (2007) provides a point of departure for the empirical analysis we conduct, the model we consider is a signi…cant extension of his framework intended to achieve empirical coherence.
Second, agents di¤er in their attitudes towards risk, since consumption enjoyed by wealthier agents is relatively distant from the minimum consumption requirement. Thus the impact of productivity shocks on these attitudes towards risk, and on asset demand, also di¤ers:
from the perspective of risk, relatively wealthy agents are better able to bear the brunt of productivity shocks. The interaction of these factors determines patterns of asset trade.
As this discussion suggests, di¤erences in …nancial wealth provide a crucial channel through which turnover arises in the model. We impose discipline in characterizing these di¤erences by working with a parameterization constrained to align steady state holdings of …nancial wealth with empirical patterns observed in the U.S. In our post-war quarterly measure, turnover has exhibited stable but volatile ‡uctuations around its sample average of 15.6%: logged deviations of turnover from trend have been more than seven times as volatile as those exhibited by output. Moreover, turnover exhibits a distinct asynchronous relationship with output. Contemporaneously, turnover and output are virtually uncorrelated. However, lagged turnover co-varies positively with output (e.g., at the four-quarter horizon, the correlation between detrended turnover and output is 0.33);
while led turnover co-varies negatively with output (-0.22 at the four-quarter horizon).
The baseline model, parameterized subject to the constraint that its steady state characterization of equity returns match the sample mean of its empirical counterpart, accounts for 29:4% of the average level of turnover observed in the data, and 22:2% of the volatility.
The extended model, parameterized to match both the sample means of returns to equity and debt, also accounts for 29:4% of the level of turnover, and up to 21:6% of the volatility.
Regarding correlation patterns, each version of the model characterizes turnover as being closely correlated with output contemporaneously, and positively correlated at both leads and lags. Thus in the context of our framework, the asynchronous relationship observed in the data represents a puzzle. Another puzzling feature of the data relative to our extended model is the volatility of returns to both risk-free debt and equity, which are predicted to be far higher that we actually observe. As Mehra and Prescott (2003) note, this empirical shortcoming is a common general feature of models designed to characterize the average levels of these returns; thus our model is not unique in this regard (e.g., see Boldrin, Christiano, and Despite these empirical shortcomings, the models we examine indicate that di¤erential ‡uctuations in asset demand arising from di¤erences in individual wealth provide a nontrivial mechanism for generating ‡uctuations in equity turnover. We view this mechanism as complementary to many additional sources of asset trade from which we have abstracted.
A To align our empirical characterization of turnover with its theoretical counterpart, we have sought to isolate from the aggregate behavior of turnover the proportion attributable to individual investors. 3 Unfortunately, our ability to do so is imperfect: information on the breakdown between individual and institutional investors in contributing to trade volume and share ownership is available only through occasional surveys conducted by the NYSE.
Data Description
Thus in the sense of Prescott (1986), our theory is ahead of measurement. Using a total of 23 data points on individual/institutional contributions to volume and share ownership, we approximated the trend behavior of the breakdown for both variables via interpolation, and adjusted aggregate turnover to account for this trend behavior. Speci…cally, denoting by V ol agg and SO agg aggregate volume and shares outstanding, our measure of individual turnover T ind is obtained via the adjustment
where %V ol ind and %SO ind are the percentages of volume generated and shares held by individual investors, and T agg is aggregate turnover. Unless %V ol ind and %SO ind exhibit cyclical behavior in addition to their secular trends, this adjustment should provide a good approximation of individual turnover. As a …nal note regarding alignment, recall that turnover in the model results from the exchange of equity and bond holdings. In turn, if the two-fund separation theorem serves as a good approximation to reality, then the turnover rate of all risky assets is the same, and thus is well-summarized by the turnover of the market portfolio (Lo and Wang, 2009).
The series are depicted in Figure 1 (along with NBER-dated business cycle peaks and 3 We thank the editor and an anonymous referee for prompting this alignment: previous versions of the paper examined the behavior of aggregate turnover.
troughs, indicated with vertical lines). Returns are represented in levels; the remaining series are represented in logs, and are depicted along with their corresponding HodrickPrescott trends (calculated using = 1; 600). While our primary interest is in the cyclical characteristics of these series, note that returns and turnover exhibit no tendency towards long-term growth, while consumption and output exhibit roughly balanced growth. 4 Our model is designed to match these features of the data.
Returns exhibit the familiar patterns underscored by Mehra and Prescott (1985) and Weil (1989) as puzzling. The mean (standard deviation) return to equity is 7.15% (15.24%), while the mean return to debt is 1.16% (2.79%); the mean equity premium is 5.995% (15.05%);
and the contemporaneous correlation of movements in these returns is 0.16. ; and for recent surveys, see Campbell, 2000 Campbell, , 2002 . Focusing on serial correlation 4 While individual turnover exhibits no tendency towards long-term growth, aggregate turnover grows at the annual average rate of 3.9%. This growth is due to the behavior of institutional investors: while both %V ol ind and %SO ind have declined over time, %V ol ind has declined relatively rapidly.
patterns, the …rst-order serial correlation between time-t and time-(t + 5) equity returns is 0.13 (the …ve-quarter spread ensures that returns are non-overlapping). For debt returns, the correlation between time-t and time-(t + 2) returns (again eliminating overlap) is 0.6 (and 0.47 between time-t and time-(t + 5)). Comparable …gures are reported, e.g., by Campbell,
2002, Table 1 .
The sample mean of turnover is 15.6% (compared to 44% for aggregate turnover); its business-cycle characteristics are summarized in Figures 2-4 . Figure 2 illustrates time-series observations of turnover and output for HP-…ltered data. To aid the comparison, each series is reported in standard deviation units. As the …gure illustrates, the relationship between turnover and output is systematic but unsynchronized. In particular, depending upon perspective, peaks in turnover tend to precede peaks in output; or peaks in output tend to precede troughs in turnover. Impulse responses between turnover and the remaining series (not depicted) appear as follows. Response patterns observed between turnover and output are qualitatively similar to those obtained by replacing output with consumption and investment. Given the strong procyclicality of consumption and investment, this similarity is unsurprising. In particular, turnover falls over a four-to …ve-quarter horizon in response to innovations to each series; while each series climbs over a four-to seven-quarter horizon in response to an innovation in turnover. The response of turnover is most distinct given an innovation to consumption (-20% at the four-quarter horizon, compared with roughly -15% for investment). In turn, the response of investment is most distinct given an innovation to turnover (peaking at roughly 38%, compared with roughly 20% for consumption).
For the relationship between turnover and returns to equity, the general pattern illustrated above is roughly reversed. In this case, given an innovation to returns, turnover is initially below trend (with a response of nearly -20%), and then rises over the next four quarters, peaking at roughly 30%. In turn, returns fall over a four-quarter horizon following an innovation to turnover, bottoming out at roughly -30%. Finally, the relationship between turnover and returns to debt is weak. In particular, cross-responses of each variable are weak, lying in roughly a 15% band. Regarding the systematic relationship noted between turnover and returns to equity, this re ‡ects the sylized fact that turnover is useful in predicting future returns (e.g., Hiemstra and Jones, 1994; Jones, 2002 to equity is roughly reverse that observed between turnover and output; while the relationship between turnover and returns to debt is non-distinct.
The Economy
The economy is populated by H (types of) in…nitely-lived agents, where h 2 H = f1; :::; Hg: Time is discrete and denoted by t = 0; 1; 2; :::. Agents are endowed with one unit of time per period, which they supply inelastically in the production sector; aggregate labor supply is thus H. Production yields a single good that can either be consumed or invested to produce new capital.
There is aggregate uncertainty in the form of shocks to total factor productivity (TFP), denoted as s t ; fs t g follows a …rst-order stationary Markov process with transition probabilities (s t ; s t+1 ) > 0, where s t 2 S t = fs; sg for all t. Let s t = (s 0 ; :::; s t ) 2 S t = t k=0 S k represent the partial history of aggregate shocks realized through date t, and X(s t ) denote the value of X chosen at node s t : These histories are observed by all agents.
There is an aggregate production technology that takes as inputs the capital good K and the labor input H. This technology features labor-improving technological progress with growth rate g: Aggregate output is given by
For all s, F (s; :; :) is homogeneous of degree 1 (HD1), strictly increasing, strictly concave, and satis…es Inada conditions. In our empirical implementation, F will be speci…ed as CobbDouglas.
Let (K; I) be the total cost of investment I; (:; :) is HD1, convex and increasing in I:
Following Jermann (1988), we assume
with
The law of motion of capital at s t is given by
where 2 (0; 1) is the depreciation rate. K 0 > 0 is the initial capital stock.
A consumption bundle for agent h is a sequence of functions fc t g cases below: a baseline under which the capital-adjustment-cost and the state-dependence of preferences are shut down; and a generalized calibration disciplined by the return puzzles. We emphasize that our purpose in evaluating the generalized model is not to provide an account of the return puzzles, but to evaluate the behavior of turnover subject to the empirical discipline imposed by the puzzles.
Since the technologies fF; g are both HD1 and preferences are represented by (4), this framework enables growth detrending. Hereafter we normalize to eliminate trend components: the detrended component of any X(ss 0 and k 0 = K 0 are given.
Competitive Equilibrium
Every period, agents meet to trade the consumption good and two assets. There is a risk-free bond held in zero net supply that pays one unit of consumption next period. Let a 
The Markovian structure of this economy allows us to study Recursive Competitive Equilibria (RCE) directly. Consider the set of state variables. At the consumer level, the state is described by individual …nancial wealth, denoted by h and de…ned below. At the …rm level, the state is described by the …rm's stock of capital {. Finally, let , k and describe the distribution of …nancial wealth, aggregate capital and outstanding shares. At the aggregate level the state is (s; ; ; k) where 0 = J(s; ; ; k) and k 0 = Z(s; ; ; k) denote laws of motion for the distribution of …nancial wealth and aggregate capital, respectively. Additionally, all agents (including the …rm) take the law of motion of outstanding shares 0 = G(s; ; ; k)
as given. Note that the aggregate shock is uniquely determined by s through (5). The price system is given by p; q RF ; w : S R + R I R J + ! R ++ representing the ex-dividend price of equity, the price of the risk-free bond and wages, respectively.
Observe that markets are dynamically complete with this asset-market structure, since s 0 2 fs; sg. By no-arbitrage, this implies that at each (s; ; K) there is a unique state price vector, denoted by (q(s; ; K)(s 0 )) s 0 2fs;sg .
Firm's Production Plans and Financial Policy
Production decisions are made by a representative …rm, who maximizes its value
d({; s; ; k) = F (s; {; l) H({; i) w(s; ; k)l;
The Modigliani-Miller Theorem states that the …rm's …nancial policy does not a¤ect equilibrium real allocations, hence it is typically assumed that there is one share outstanding every period. However, changes in shares outstanding do a¤ect the amount of assets traded in equilibrium, and thus the extent of equity trade. Thus for our purposes it is important to incorporate the speci…cation of a …nancial policy that is empirically relevant, in that it admits growth in shares outstanding, and makes explicit how dividends per share are determined in light of this growth. Regarding the growth of shares outstanding, this is observed to be remarkably stable over time, as illustrated in Figure A1 . Therefore we assume the growth of shares obeys 0 = G(s; ; ; k) = (1 + g s ) 8 (s; ; ; k);
with the growth rate of issued shares g s representing an important parameter to be calibrated to match its empirical counterpart. Then, given that ( 
such that 0 = G(s; ; ; k): Thus an agent holding h shares will receive the dividend payment h d f ({; s; ; k) at the beginning of the period. Any ( 0 ; ; d f ) satisfying (8) and (9) is a …nancial policy.
Given a price system (p; q RF ; w h ) and laws of motion (G; J; H), agent h 0 s problem is (RCE 4) Consistency. For all (s; ; ; k), each h)
For notational convenience, the consistency condition (that aggregate levels be consistent with individual behavior) is imposed to avoid the need to express optimal decision rules as functions of individual state variables. Also, since …nancial policies a¤ect neither equilibrium allocations nor equilibrium state prices (q(s 0 )), these will not include as an argument. For instance, we directly write c h (s; ; k):
As noted, given the near-constant-growth trajectory for shares outstanding observed in the data, as illustrated in Figure A1 , we assume that the shares outstanding grow at the constant rate g s : The following equilibrium property allows us to simplify the analysis. Proof. See Technical Appendix.
Measuring Trading Volume: The Turnover Rate
To see why Proposition 1 simpli…es the analysis, recall that we follow Lo and Wang (2009) in quantifying stock trading volume as the turnover rate. This is de…ned as (s; ; ; k) = 1 2
where P h 0 h = 0 in equilibrium. Proposition 1 implies that we can compute (10) using
where
That is, we can solve the model for the economy de…ned with = 1; and then compute turnover using (11) given g s .
Equilibrium Portfolios
To calculate the turnover rate, we must compute equilibrium portfolios explicitly. To do so, we follow an indirect strategy and implement a recursive version of Negishi's (1960) computational approach. Details are provided in the Technical Appendix.
Let
2 R I + denote the vector of welfare weight assigned to the agents that parametrize some Pareto Optimal (PO) allocation. Under our assumptions, the policy functions regarding agregagate consumption, next period capital and investment are independent of this distributional paramenter (i.e., c(s; k), k 0 (s; k); i(s; k)) while individual consumption is allocated according to
It can be shown that there exists a unique welfare weight 0 such that the corresponding PO allocation, denoted (c h (s; k)) h2H ; k 0 (s; k); i(s; k) , can be decentralized as a RCE.
Furthermore, given (s; k) the distribution of …nancial wealth that supports a RCE can be uniquely determined by some function (s; k). This implies that the state space reduces to (s; k). For each agent h, his individual …nancial wealth, h , is the unique solution to the functional equation
Given the individual levels of …nancial wealth, ( h (s; k)) h2H , the corresponding equilibrium portfolios are constructed as follows.
for all s 2 fs; sg.
This system (generically) has a unique solution for each h: Equilibrium portfolios for each h are determined by
where = (s; k) = [ 1 (s; k); :::; H (s; k)] represents the aggregate distribution of wealth uniquely determined by (s; k). An important feature of this framework is that the …nancial endogenous state variable is determined uniquely by (13) . This implies that equilibrium portfolios depend upon (s; k) only through k 0 (s; k), the law of motion of the endogenous physical state variable.
Intuition Regarding Turnover
We conclude this section by providing intuition regarding the behavior of turnover, particularly in response to innovations in s. To do so, we need to introduce some notation further discussed in the Technical Appendix.
Let v M (s; k) denote the value of the minimum consumption requirement which uniquely
Similarly, de…ne v W (s; k) as the individual human wealth which uniquely solves
Finally, let v F (s; k) = p(s; k) + d(s; k) denote the value of the representative …rm which
i.e., v F (s; k) is interpreted as the aggregate value of …nancial wealth. The welfare weight 0 parametrizes the PO allocation that decentralizes as a RCE and is normalized such that
Note that (13) and (14) can be used to express agent h 0 s demand for equity holdings, which is given by
Thus the impact of an innovation in s on equity demand is given by the ratio of this impact on the dispersion of agent h 0 s …nancial wealth next period (the numerator) relative to the impact on the dispersion of aggregate …nancial wealth next period (the denominator).
In general, the impact on this ratio can be non-monotonic in wealth. But under the calibrated structure we consider, the wealthier the agent the larger the impact. Speci…cally, it follows from (30) in the Technical Appendix that
Thus for a given response of R(k 0 (s; k)) to an innovation in s; the response of equity demand is larger the larger is the welfare weight ( 0 h ) 1= ; and thus the larger is wealth.
Regarding R(k 0 (s; k)), this is positive and increasing in s. To see why R(k 0 (s; k)) is positive, observe for the numerator that since the di¤erence between wages and the minimum consumption requirement is increasing in s, so too is the di¤erence in their values; this di¤erence is interpretable as disposable human wealth. For the denominator, dividends are increasing in s; thus so too is the value of the …rm.
To see why R(k 0 (s; k)) is increasing in s, k 0 is increasing in s due to standard consumptionsmoothing arguments. Further, the di¤erence between wages and the minimum consumption requirement is increasing in k 0 due to the technological complementarity between capital and labor, thus so too is the di¤erence in their values. So the numerator is increasing in k 0 . The denominator is also increasing in k 0 since dividends are increasing in k 0 , but not by as much as the numerator. This appears to be the case because the …rm increases investment when k 0 increases, thus smoothing its value. As a result, R(k 0 (s; k)) is both positive and increasing in k 0 ; and thus also in s.
Given this behavior for R(k 0 (s; k)), the equity demand of relatively wealthy agents (those with welfare weights (
) is increasing in s. Through a similar derivation, the demand for risk-free bonds can be shown to be decreasing in s for the same agents. So following a positive productivity shock, equity ‡ows from poor to rich agents, while bonds ‡ow from rich to poor agents.
Following Espino (2007) , note two factors that are critical in determining the responsiveness of R(k 0 (s; k)); and thus ultimately turnover, to innovations in s: The …rst is the correlation between v W and v F induced by innovations in s: the closer the correspondence, the less responsive will be turnover. Indeed, absent the minimum consumption requirement, if v W and v F were perfectly correlated, turnover would be zero. All else equal, the greater the wedge between v W and v F ; the greater the volatility of turnover.
The second factor is the presence of the minimum consumption requirement: for a given correspondence between v W and v F , a non-zero minimum consumption requirement ampli…es the response of R(k 0 (s; k)) to an innovation in s: To see why, note from the speci…cation of instantaneous utility that agent h 0 s measure of relative risk aversion is given by
Absent the minimum consumption requirement, (relative) risk aversion is equal across agent types; but the positive requirement renders relative risk aversion as wealth dependent: in particular, poorer agents are relatively risk averse. Moreover, for a given innovation in s, the subsequent response of risk aversion will be greater the poorer is the agent. Di¤erential responses of risk aversion to innovations (i.e., di¤erences in ( 0 h ) 1= ) translate into di¤eren-tial portfolio rebalancing responses (see equation (17)). Thus the minimum consumption requirement, along with ; both serve as potential sources of ampli…cation in this environment.
So with relatively poor agents featuring a relatively strong consumption-smoothing incentive that moreover is particularly responsive to innovations in s, why then is equity demand increasing in s for rich agents, and decreasing for poor agents? The reason is the dominance of a substitution over an income e¤ect for poor agents. Regarding the latter, a positive innovation to s enriches all agents, thus decreasing their risk aversion and increasing their demand for equity. As noted, this e¤ect is more intense the poorer is the agent. However, there is also a substitution e¤ect: the decrease in risk aversion drives up the price of equity relative to debt. For rich agents, the income e¤ect dominates, thus their demand for equity is increasing in s: For poor agents, the substitution e¤ect dominates, thus their demand for equity is decreasing in s: (Recall that within a period, the supply of equity shares is …xed.)
Again, rich agents are de…ned as having welfare weights (
H ; as seen in (16). We conclude this discussion with a note regarding the mapping of equity demand to turnover. Substituting for h in (21) using (15) - (17), turnover may be expressed as
The term jR(k 0 (s; k)) R(k)j is dependent solely upon the structural speci…cation of the model. Given an innovation s, the larger the response in R to movements in aggregate capital, the larger the technological component of turnover. In contrast, the term
is purely distributional, and independent of the aggregate state (s; k): This component re‡ects the impact of wealth dispersion on risk aversion and, thus, on turnover. Thus through this mechanism, all else equal, a given innovation in s will have an ampli…ed impact on turnover the greater is the wedge between degrees of risk aversion observed across agent types, parametrized by the dispersion of (
Quantifying Asset Returns and Turnover
To facilitate quantitative analysis, returns and turnover are de…ned to correspond with their empirical counterparts. For returns, three considerations a¤ect alignment: a period corresponds to a quarter; returns are annualized; and while model variables are in detrended form, returns are calculated using trending data. Thus for each (s; k) and s 0 ; let
and de…ne the price of the risk-free bond as
Then the annualized risk-free rate is given by
and annualized equity returns are given by R e (s; K) = 100 ln
Regarding turnover, let 0 be given by (32) and de…ne
where h (s; k; ) is given by (31) . Likewise, let
where d(s; k) and p(s; k) are as de…ned in (28) and (29) .
Then equilibrium portfolios can be constructed using 2
1 is the 2 2 matrix evaluated at k 0 (s; k). In turn, given Proposition 1 turnover is given by
4 Empirical Implementation
Calibration
We specify …ve individual types (I = 5), and a two-state Markov process for s parameterized to mimic the …rst-order autoregressive representation s t = (1 ) + s t 1 + " t : In turn, and the standard deviation of " t ( " ) were chosen so that the parameterized model matched the observed …rst-order serial correlation and standard deviation of output. Given values chosen for the additional parameters, the corresponding speci…cation of ( ; " ) turned out to be (0:7743; 0:00929) for the baseline model, and (0:6715; 0:0091) for the extended model. The di¤erence in indicates that the extended model has a relatively strong internal propagation mechanism. Table 1 presents parameterizations for both models.
For both models, capital's share was set at 0.33; the discount factor at 0.99 (implying an annualized discount rate of approximately 4%); the depreciation rate at 0.025 (implying an annual depreciation rate of 10%); g at 0.00475 (matching the observed 1.9% annualized growth rate of output); and g s at 0.0235 (matching the observed 9.4% annualized growth rate of shares outstanding). We take these speci…cations as standard, and do not present results obtained using alternative speci…cations along these dimensions.
The welfare weights h were chosen so that the corresponding steady state distribution of …nancial wealth across individual types matched the distribution of wealth holdings across U.S. households reported by Budria-Rodriguez et al. (2002) . Speci…cally, their Table 7 reports shares of total wealth across household quintiles constructed using the 1998 Survey of Consumer Finances. Note from our Table 1 The remaining parameters to be assigned for the baseline model are the minimum consumption value and the curvature parameter speci…ed for the instantaneous utility function. (The additional parameters associated with the extended model are discussed below.)
As a benchmark, we set to 5% of the steady state level of consumption, and experiment with alternative speci…cations in the range of 0% to 8%. The latter value is an upper bound imposed by the condition (implicit in (32) of Proposition 2) that the combined value of human and …nancial wealth must exceed the value of the minimum consumption requirement for all individual types. Finally, was calibrated so that the steady state return to equity implied by the model matched the sample average observed in the data. (As noted, it is not possible to jointly match the returns to both equity and the risk-free asset in the baseline model.) The resulting value turned out to be 1.732. Table 1 also reports the mapping of h into the consumption weights αi/ α5 is the weight the Social Planner assigns to the ith relative to the 5th quintile;
ci* denotes the steady state consumption of individuals in quintile i; and RRAi* is the steady state measure of relative risk aversion of individuals in quintile i. The targeted distribution of non-human wealth is from Budria-Rodriguez et al. (2002), Table 7 . Wealth shares and distributional characteristics are common across models.
The results to which we now turn are based on simulated data generated using non-linear model approximations. These are based on policy functions c(s; k), p(s; k); etc. represented as Chebyshev polynomials. Polynomial approximations were constructed using the projection method outlined, e.g., in Judd (1988) and DeJong with Dave (2007). Sample statistics calculated from simulated data are based on arti…cial sample sizes of 10,000, obtained after discarding 1,000 burn-in observations (to eliminate the in ‡uence of initial conditions). Figure 5 illustrates impulse responses of turnover and output resulting from a one-standarddeviation innovation to s t : The responses were obtained using the baseline model; those associated with the extended model are comparable. Table 2 and Figure 6 present comparisons of theoretical and empirical moments for both models. (1992) and Rouwenhorst (1995) .
Results
Turning to the behavior of turnover, the steady state level of turnover in the model is 4.59%, while the average level of turnover in the data is 15.6%; thus the model accounts for 29.4% of the level of turnover. This result holds for all extensions of the model we consider.
Regarding volatility, the ratio of standard deviations of turnover and output is 1.747 in the model, compared with 7.883 for the data. That is, the wealth-discrepancy channel that serves to generate equity trade in the model accounts for roughly 22% of observed ‡uctuations in turnover. However, note from Figure Consider now the sensitivity of this measure to changes in and ; as reported in Table 3 .
Regarding ; its main impact is on the volatility of turnover relative to output. Speci…cally, ; and the additional moments reported in Table 2 Regarding ; note that the model's characterization of equity returns is sensitive to changes in this curvature parameter. For example, with = 2; equity returns increase from 7.152 to 7.64. So unlike ; is tightly identi…ed, thus we discount deviations from the baseline parameterization along this dimension. Consider now the extended model. Beginning again with performance along familiar dimensions, on the positive side, the model once again does well in characterizing the relative volatilities of consumption and investment relative to output. Also, the model is calibrated to exactly match the risk-free return, and does so while also nearly matching the equity premium. This is as expected, in light of Jermann (1998) Regarding sensitivity to , at the upper bound of = 0:07c , Table 3 indicates that turnover volatility increases to 1.71; at the lower bound of zero, volatility falls to 1.24. As in the baseline case, note that the extended model's characterization of returns is relatively insensitive to changes in ; e.g., at = 0:07c ; risk-free returns change by only 0.005, to 1.161. Thus the turnover volatility measurement of 1.71, or 22% of that measured in the data, provides an upper bound; and the measure of 1.24, or 16% of that measured in the data, provides a lower bound.
Regarding ; note once again that this parameter is tightly identi…ed. So too is the shock parameter : decreases in generate substantial increases in the steady state risk-free rate, and corresponding reductions in the equity premium, leaving the measure of turnover volatility relatively una¤ected. Thus we discount deviations from the baseline parameterization along the dimensions of and . We close with a heuristic description of the strong positive contemporaneous correlation between output and turnover generated by the model. Consider for simplicity a two-agent speci…cation wherein agent 1 has a relatively large welfare weight, so that her equity holdings 1 exceed 1 in the steady state, and are increasing in s: Since 2 = 1 1 ; agent 2's equity holdings are negative in the steady state, and are decreasing in s: (Agent 1 corresponds with the wealthiest agent in the calibrated models discussed above; and agent 2 with the poorest agents.)
The contribution of agent h to aggregate turnover is given by
where 0 h denotes agent h's equity holdings in period t + 1. The v-shaped t h 's are depicted in Figure 7 for the example described above. Note that in the steady state, In both versions of the fully calibrated models upon which our results are based, it turns out that the wealthiest agent always maintains equity holdings on the right arm of t h , and the poorest agents always maintain equity holdings on the left arm. This accounts for the strong positive correlation between output and aggregate turnover generated by the models.
In the context of these models, the low contemporaneous correlation observed in the data is puzzling.
Conclusion
We have portrayed the cyclical behavior of the turnover of equity shares generated by individual investors on the New York Stock Exchange, and have o¤ered a theoretical characterization of this behavior. The theoretical characterization emphasizes di¤erences in …nancial wealth across agents as giving rise to di¤erential ‡uctuations in asset demand in response to productivity shocks; equity trade occurs as a result. We …nd that this simple mechanism accounts for 29% of the average level of turnover observed in the data, and 22% of its volatility. As e¤orts to build upon our understanding of turnover continue, this mechanism warrants recognition as an important building block.
Technical Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1. Let p(s; 1; ; k) denote the ex-dividend price of the …rm, which uniquely solves the operator
Since there is one outstanding share, this is also the ex-dividend price of the share. The stochastic return is given as usual by
Consider now the economy with …nancial policy (8) . Let p(s; ; ; k) be the ex-dividend price of one share when there are outstanding shares at the beginning of the period. This price
Additionally, observe that 0 p(s; ; ; k) = (1 + g s )p(s; ; ; k)
Consequently, it follows by uniqueness that p(s; 1; ; k) = (1 + g s )p(s; ; ; k);
for all (i.e., the ex-dividend price of the …rm equals the value of the end-of-period shares outstanding). Using (23) , it follows from (22) that equilibrium returns are una¤ected by the …rm's …nancial policy. Thus, returns can be computed directly using (22) .
Finally, we check that the alternative policy function is the agent's optimal choice. Market clearing is satis…ed by de…nition. It also follows by (9) and (23) where
Note that d(s; ; ; k) = d(s; ; k) for all since production plans are una¤ected by the …rm's …nancial policy.
PO Allocations and the Planner' s Problem
The set of PO allocations can be parametrized by welfare weights 2 R I + , where h denotes the welfare weight assigned to agent h. Since only the allocation of consumption across individuals is a¤ected by , …rst the planner solves (PPRN) and then distributes consumption across agent types following the allocation rule (26) given below. Speci…cally, the planner's problem solves
where A = H is the aggregate minimum consumption requirement.
Denoting the set of continuous policy functions solving (PPRN) as (c(s; k); k 0 (s; k); i(s; k)) ;
individual consumption is allocated according to
Computing the RCE: Negishi' s Approach
Given the policy functions (c(s; k); k 0 (s; k); i(s; k)), the RCE is constructed as follows.
State prices are given by the stochastic discount factor
Regarding equity, let v F (s; k) denote the value of the representative …rm given by the unique solution to
and w(s; k) = F l (s; k; H) denotes the implicit wage. With outstanding equity shares normalized to one, the ex-dividend price of equity p(s; k) is given
Hereafter, v F (s; k) is interpreted as the aggregate value of …nancial wealth. Similarly, the value v M (s; k) of the minimum consumption requirement is given uniquely by
To compute the remaining ingredients needed to construct a RCE, consider any allocation parametrized by such that 
Individual consumption is …nanced from two sources. The …rst is wages which provides an associated income stream valued uniquely as
Hereafter, we describe v W (s; k) as representing individual human wealth. The second source of …nancing is individual …nancial wealth, which is given by
Given uniqueness, it follows from feasibility that 
As mentioned, this system (generically) has a unique solution for each h: Below we show how to use it to construct equilibrium portfolios.
The following proposition characterizes the unique PO allocation that can be decentralized as a RCE with zero initial transfers. Once this speci…c welfare vector has been identi…ed, corresponding equilibrium prices and portfolios are constructed using the objects de…ned in 
Proof. See Espino (2007).
7 Data Appendix
De…nitions and Sources
Turnover is volume (total shares traded) as a percentage of shares outstanding on the NYSE. Volume data are from Yahoo (finance.yahoo.com); shares outstanding are from the NYSE factbook (www.nysedata.com/factbook).
Volume is reported as daily averages observed over the month; they are converted to a quarterly measure by averaging the (deseasonalized) monthly measures. Shares outstanding are reported as yearly averages; dividing by the number of trading days during the year (from the NYSE factbook) yields conversion to daily averages. Annual data are converted to a quarterly measure via log-linear interpolation. Letting g( ) denote the growth in shares outstanding observed between years and + 1, and so shares outstanding reported in year , the quarterly measures so ;i , i = (I; II; III; IV ) are constructed as so ;i = so e 0:25g( )(i 1) :
Aggregate turnover T agg is converted to a measure of turnover attributable to individual investors as described in the text: denoting by V ol agg and SO agg aggregate volume and shares outstanding, individual turnover T ind is obtained via the adjustment Interpolated observations beyond the …nal observation date x t+J are constructed using g J :
Approximations are based on a total of 23 data points, the latest of which is 1980:IV.
Returns to equity r e are annualized real returns accruing to the stocks included in the S&P 
Comparing Volume and Turnover
Di¤erences between volume and turnover amount to di¤erences in trend behavior. Recall that turnover is de…ned as volume measured as a percentage of shares outstanding. The behavior of shares outstanding is depicted in Figure A1 . Note that the series conforms closely to its estimated log-linear trajectory, which grows at an annual average rate of 9.4%
(the standard deviation of logged departures from trend is 0.093). 
